Supreme Court Limits Human Rights Lawsuits Against U.S. Companies in Landmark Cisco Ruling

WASHINGTON, D.C. — The U.S. Supreme Court has delivered a significant ruling limiting the ability of victims of alleged human rights abuses overseas to pursue certain lawsuits in American courts against companies and individuals accused of helping facilitate those abuses.

In Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, decided June 23, 2026, the Court ruled 6–3 that federal judges cannot create new legal claims under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of international law. The Court also concluded that the Torture Victim Protection Act does not authorize claims based on aiding and abetting torture. The decision reversed a lower court’s judgment that had allowed the plaintiffs’ case to proceed. Source: Supreme Court opinion.

The case involved allegations that Cisco Systems and two of its executives helped Chinese authorities persecute members of Falun Gong, a religious movement whose practitioners have faced repression in China. The plaintiffs alleged that Cisco developed and supplied surveillance technology that enabled authorities to identify, track, apprehend, and abuse members of the group.

Cisco disputed the legal basis for holding the company and its executives liable under the statutes in question. The Supreme Court’s decision ultimately turned on the scope of those laws and the authority of federal courts to recognize claims that Congress has not expressly established.

The ruling could have significant consequences for future litigation involving alleged corporate assistance in human rights abuses committed outside the United States.

The Background of the Case

The lawsuit began in 2011, when individuals associated with Falun Gong brought claims against Cisco and two executives. The plaintiffs alleged that Chinese authorities used surveillance technology connected to Cisco’s systems to identify and persecute practitioners because of their religious beliefs.

Their allegations included torture, arbitrary detention, forced labor, forced disappearance, extrajudicial killing, and other violations of international law. These were allegations presented in litigation, not findings that the Supreme Court independently established as facts.

The plaintiffs relied primarily on two federal laws: the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.

The Alien Tort Statute, enacted in 1789, gives federal district courts jurisdiction over certain civil actions brought by foreign nationals for torts committed in violation of international law or a U.S. treaty.

Although the statute has existed for more than two centuries, its modern application has been the subject of substantial legal debate. Plaintiffs have attempted to use it to seek compensation for alleged abuses involving torture, forced labor, and other serious violations of internationally recognized rights.

The Torture Victim Protection Act, meanwhile, expressly provides a civil cause of action for certain acts of torture and extrajudicial killing committed under the conditions specified by the statute.

The central question was whether these laws allowed the plaintiffs to sue defendants for allegedly assisting others in committing human rights violations, rather than personally carrying out the underlying abuses.

What the Supreme Court Decided

Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the Court’s majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh.

On the Alien Tort Statute, the majority concluded that federal courts do not have authority to create new causes of action for violations of international norms. The Court emphasized that the statute grants jurisdiction but does not itself establish a comprehensive set of legal claims that plaintiffs may bring.

The majority reasoned that creating new causes of action is principally a responsibility for Congress. It also highlighted the potential foreign-policy consequences of allowing American courts to develop legal claims concerning conduct involving foreign governments and events taking place abroad.

Under this interpretation, plaintiffs cannot use the Alien Tort Statute to pursue a judge-created claim for aiding and abetting violations of international law.

The Court separately examined the Torture Victim Protection Act. It concluded that the law’s language does not provide a cause of action against someone merely for aiding and abetting torture.

The distinction is important because the two statutes serve different legal functions. The Alien Tort Statute concerns federal jurisdiction over certain international-law tort claims, while the Torture Victim Protection Act expressly authorizes particular civil claims under defined circumstances.

The Supreme Court’s judgment reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Source: Cornell Legal Information Institute.

A Disagreement Among the Justices

The decision was not unanimous.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the Court had interpreted the Alien Tort Statute too narrowly and restricted an important avenue for victims seeking remedies for serious violations of international law.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson agreed with parts of the Court’s analysis concerning the Torture Victim Protection Act but joined the dissent on significant aspects of the Alien Tort Statute question. Justice Elena Kagan also joined portions of the dissenting opinions.

The disagreement reflected a broader debate about the relationship between judicial authority, congressional lawmaking, and accountability for alleged human rights abuses.

The majority placed considerable weight on the principle that federal courts should not create new legal claims without sufficient authorization from Congress. The dissenting justices took a different view of the Alien Tort Statute’s historical role and the potential for existing law to provide remedies in appropriate cases.

That disagreement is likely to remain relevant as courts consider future claims involving corporate conduct and alleged violations of international law.

What the Decision Means for American Companies

For U.S. companies operating internationally, the ruling clarifies the limits of potential liability under these two statutes.

Businesses frequently supply technology, equipment, financial services, and other products to customers around the world. In some circumstances, plaintiffs have argued that corporate products or services were knowingly used to facilitate abuses by governments or other actors.

The Cisco case illustrates the legal difficulties involved in translating such allegations into a civil claim under U.S. law.

Following the ruling, plaintiffs cannot rely on a judicially created aiding-and-abetting claim under the Alien Tort Statute, and the Torture Victim Protection Act cannot be used to impose aiding-and-abetting liability under the Court’s interpretation.

However, the decision should not be read as granting American companies blanket immunity from all lawsuits involving overseas conduct. Other statutes, legal theories, jurisdictions, and factual circumstances may present different questions. Whether a particular lawsuit can proceed depends on the applicable law and the specific claims involved.

The ruling instead establishes an important limitation on the use of these two particular statutes.

The Implications for Human Rights Advocates

Human rights organizations and attorneys representing victims may face greater obstacles when attempting to seek compensation in U.S. federal courts for abuses allegedly facilitated by American businesses abroad.

For families seeking accountability, civil litigation can be one way to obtain financial compensation, establish a public record, or examine the role of companies whose products or services may have been used in alleged abuses.

The Supreme Court’s decision narrows the legal routes available under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act for claims based on aiding and abetting.

Critics of the ruling argue that limiting these lawsuits may leave some victims with fewer practical options, especially when the alleged abuses occurred in countries where independent investigations or effective legal remedies are difficult to obtain.

The majority’s approach, by contrast, places responsibility on Congress to determine whether and how additional civil liability should be established.

That means any broader expansion of liability under these statutes would require legislative action rather than the creation of new claims by federal judges.

What Happens Next?

The immediate consequence of the decision is that the Cisco litigation must be handled in accordance with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statutes.

The broader consequences will emerge as lower courts apply the ruling to other cases and determine which claims remain legally available under different laws.

Congress could also consider legislation if lawmakers wish to establish additional remedies for victims of international human rights abuses. Any such proposal would require its own legislative process and could raise questions about corporate responsibility, foreign relations, evidence, and the limits of U.S. jurisdiction.

For now, the ruling establishes a clear boundary: federal courts cannot create new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of international norms, and the Torture Victim Protection Act does not authorize aiding-and-abetting claims.

The decision represents a major development in the continuing debate over how far American courts should reach when alleged human rights abuses occur overseas and private companies are accused of helping facilitate them.

Ultimately, the Cisco ruling is not a determination that the alleged abuses never occurred. It is a decision about the legal authority of federal courts and the remedies available under two specific federal statutes. Its lasting significance will depend on how future cases are shaped by that distinction and whether Congress chooses to address the questions the Court has left to the legislative branch.